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The Spread of Antibiotic-Resistant Bacteria through
Medical Tourism and Transmission Prevention Under
the International Health Regulations
Tamara L. Hill*

Abstract
Medical tourism-travel by healthcare patients to a foreign location for medical
treatment-is a growing industy. Healthcare is nationally regulated in eveU county, and
defficulies arise where legal remedies and standards vary between a medical tourist's resident
and destination county. Antibiotic-resistantbacteria, which are typicaly limited to healthcare
settings and close community quarters, have predictable risk factors. These predictable risk
factorsgenerally reduce concern regardinghealthcare-assodatedstrains in the medical community
because hospitals can set admission and contact policies to reduce the pread of healthcareassociated strains.As medical tourism increases, however, the spread of healthcare-associated
antibiotic-resistantbacteria infections is also likely to increase becausepatients are more likely
to be exposed to hospitals and healthcare settings in diferent countries. Patients may thus
spread their infections to faclities aroundthe world. One recently discovered antibiotic-resistant
strain of bacteria has shown evidence of fast internationalspread due to connections with
medical tourism.
There are a number ofpossible solutions to the public health and economic implications
of the rapid spread of existing and potential antibiotic-resistant bacteria. These solutions
include: containment strategies implemented by the World Health OrganiZation (WIIHO)
under the InternationalHealth Regulations 2005 (1HR); race-to-the-top strategies that do not
require state intervention at any level, where patients seek out hospitals that best manage
infectious disease; containmentprocedures utiliZed by individualcountries to prevent incoming
infections, similar to the classical IHR regime; and information-forcing regimes at either
nationalor internationallevels, which can supplement any of the other three regulatory and
economic solutions by instituting reporting requirements on individual states. To date, the
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WIHO has never used the IHR to make recommendations regarding antibiotic-resistant
bacteria. This Comment discusses the growth and practices of medical tourism, the development
and ipread of antibiotic-resistantbacteria, and compares the attributes of antibiotic-resistant
bacteriato the attributes ofpreviousl declaredpandemic diseases. This Comment proposes that
the application of the IHR to antibiotic-resistantbacteria pread though medical tourism is
consistent with the language of the IHR and concludes that the IHR offers the most effident
andpotenialy effective method of combating transmission of antibiotic-resistantbacteria.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Medical tourism-travel by healthcare patients to a foreign location for
medical treatment-is a growing industry.' Broadly, medical tourism may refer
to all travel for healthcare, but the most typical definition focuses particularly on
international medical tourism, which is travel between countries for medical
treatment. This definition does not include healthcare provided to foreign
tourists that is incidental to travel for other purposes, such as business or
recreation. Many patients travel abroad for medical treatment due to significant
cost savings, to utilize procedures not approved for treatment in their resident
countries, or to exercise control over healthcare where public or private
Deloitte Center for Health Solutions, Medical Tourism: Update and Impkcaions 3 (Oct 26, 2009),
online
at
http://www.deloitte.com/assets/DcomUnitedStates/Local%20Assets/Documents/uschs_ MedicalTourism_ 102609.pdf (visited Apr 8,
2011) ("Barring any tempering factors such as supply constraints, resistance from health plans,
increased domestic competition, or governmental policies, we project that outbound medical
tourism could reach upwards of 1.6 million patients by 2012, with sustainable annual growth of 35
percent.").
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insurance plans provide limited treatment options.2 Healthcare is nationally
regulated in every country, and difficulties arise where legal remedies and
standards vary between a medical tourist's resident and destination country. In
particular, medical malpractice, safety certification and licensing, and privacy are
recurring topics in medical tourism literature.3 Other ethical issues have been
addressed by political organizations and the media, including lack of available
care for residents of medical tourism destination countries or black market organ
transplants.4
However, not all of the repercussions of medical tourism are limited to
those affecting only the patient, such as safety, cost, and liability. Antibioticresistant bacteria are typically limited to healthcare settings, and strains of
antibiotic-resistant bacteria that spread outside of a healthcare setting, like
community-associated methicillin-resistant staphylococcus aureus (MRSA),
provoke more concern, since healthcare-associated strains have predictable risk
factors.' These predictable risk factors generally reduce concern regarding
healthcare-associated strains in the medical community because hospitals can set
admission and contact policies to reduce the spread of healthcare associated
strains. As medical tourism increases, however, the spread of healthcareassociated antibiotic-resistant bacteria infections is also likely to increase,
because patients are more likely to be exposed to hospitals and healthcare
settings in different countries and thus spread their infections to facilities around
the world. Exposure without patient knowledge, language barriers, and

2

See Nicolas P. Terry, Under-RegulatedHealth Care Phenomena in a Flat World, 29 W New Eng L Rev
421, 423 (2007):
Such patients are attracted by the lower costs of procedures in less-developed
countries, the opportunity to avoid their home country's health care rationing
... the need for a procedure still under regulatory review in their home
country, or a belief in the healing potential of alternative procedures or
medicines such as laetrile.
See also Deloitte Center for Health Solutions, Medcal Touism: Consumers in Search of Value 4 (2008),
online at http://www.aimisspine.com/downloads/DeloitteMedicalTourismStudy.pdf (visited
Mar 12, 2011) (discussing lower cost for comparable medical treatment and greater control over
treatment options).

3

See, for example, Sanjiv N. Singh and Robert M. Wachter, Perspectives on Medal Outsouring and
Telemedicine-Rough Edges in a Flat World?, 358 New Eng J Med 1622, 1622 (2008) ("In this article,
we explore some of the critical regulatory, legal, and policy issues surrounding healthcare.").

4

See, for example, Participants in the International Summit on Transplant Tourism and Organ
Trafficking, The Declaration of Istanbul on Organ Trafficking and Transplant Tourism, 74 Kidney
International 854 (International Society of Nephrology 2008); Jon Hamilton, Medcal Tomism
at
2007),
online
Nov
29,
Shortage
(NPR
Thai
Doctor
Creates
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=16735157 (visited Apr 8, 2011).

5

R. Monina Kievens, et al, Invasive Methicilfn-Resistant Staphylococcus aureus Infections in the United States,
298 J Am Med Assoc 1763, 1767 (Oct 17, 2007).
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inconsistent healthcare regulation and hospital policies reduce the predictability
of transmission. One recently discovered antibiotic-resistant strain of bacteria,
named New Delhi metallo-beta-lactamase (NDM-1), has shown evidence of fast
international spread due to connections with medical tourism.'
This Comment will discuss possible solutions to public health and
economic implications of the rapid spread of existing and potential antibioticresistant bacteria. Possible solutions include: containment strategies
implemented by the World Health Organization (WHO) under the International
Health Regulations 2005 (IHR); race-to-the-top strategies that do not require
state intervention at any level, where patients seek out hospitals that best manage
infectious disease; containment procedures utilized by individual countries to
prevent incoming infections, similar to the classical IHR regime; and
information-forcing regimes at either national or international levels, which can
supplement any of the other three regulatory and economic solutions by
instituting reporting requirements on individual states.
Although this Comment considers the IHR to be a possible solution to the
problem posed by antibiotic-resistant bacteria and transmission through medical
tourism, the WHO has never used the IHR to make recommendations regarding
antibiotic-resistant bacteria.' The only specific mention of antibiotic-resistant
bacteria in the IHR appears in Annex 2, which contains a flow chart with
questions as a decision instrument for classifying pandemic outbreaks.' The
Annex 2 chart poses a number of questions, and each must be answered in the
affirmative to qualify for pandemic recommendations.' The question of high
public impact is explicitly answered as to antibiotic resistance; antibiotic-resistant
bacteria are considered to have a high public health impact." Since transmission
of healthcare associated strains of antibiotic-resistant bacteria is limited to

6

Kate Kelland and Ben Hirschler, Scientists FindNew Superbug Spreadingfrom India, Reuters (Aug 11,
2010), online at http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE67A0YU20100811
(visited Apr 9,
2011) ("At a global level, this is a real concern,' [Timothy] Walsh, from Britain's Cardiff
University, said in telephone interview. 'Because of medical tourism and international travel in
general, resistance to these types of bacteria has the potential to spread around the world very,
very quickly.").

7

The WHO recognizes antibiotic-resistant bacteria as a health problem, but due to the slow spread
of antibiotic-resistant bacteria outside the healthcare setting, has not considered it in light of
pandemic outbreaks. See, for example, World Health Organization, Antimicrobial Resistance, Fact
at
online
2011),
Feb
Centre
(Media
194
No
Sheet
http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fsl94/en/ (visited Apr 9, 2011).

8

World Health Organization, International Health Regulations, 43-46 (2005) ("IH-R").

9

Id.

10

Id at 44.
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exposure in healthcare or close community settings," however, the other
requirements for pandemic recommendations are not met.12
This Comment is organized as follows: Section II discusses the growth and
practices of medical tourism, including current state- and self-regulatory
measures. Section III.A discusses the appearance and spread of antibioticresistant bacteria, including both MRSA and NDM-1, and their public health
and economic ramifications. Section III.B compares the attributes of antibioticresistant bacteria to the attributes of infectious diseases that historically
presented sufficiently great danger of transmission to warrant action under the
IHR or its predecessor documents. This section analyzes the dangers presented
by different types of diseases and addresses the difference between pandemictype diseases and healthcare-associated diseases, particularly in light of global
travel and other factors affecting modern disease transmission. Section IV
considers application of the IHR to antibiotic-resistant bacteria spread though
medical tourism; it also explains the development of the current IHR and its
historical focus on pandemic-type diseases. Section V provides a textual analysis
of the IHR by applying the IHR's language to antibiotic-resistant bacteria and its
rapid spread through medical tourism. Section VI.A considers potential response
measures under the IHR, including both temporary and standing
recommendations. This section also addresses recommendations previously
issued under other pandemic situations, including the recent H1N1 pandemic
and the SARS influenza, in order to determine if the WHO would be likely to
consider issuing recommendations that would adequately respond to the
growing problem of antibiotic-resistant bacterial diseases. The remaining part of
Section VI analyzes alternatives to IHR recommendations, including the possible
results of an unregulated medical tourism market, industry self-regulatory
efforts, individual national regulation, and international regulation by multilateral
treaty or by the WHO beyond the measures contemplated by the IHR.
II. MEDICAL TOURISM
Until the late twentieth century, medical tourism existed primarily as a tool
for people of economic means to obtain high-quality medical care.13 As

11
12

13

Klevens, 298 J Am Med Assoc at 1763 (cited in note 5).
IHR at 45-46 (stating three questions in addition to the public health risk, one of which must be
answered in the positive to be eligible for recommendations under the IHR) (cited in note 8). To
date, the WHO has never considered any antibiotic-resistant bacteria as a pandemic for regulation
under the IHR.
See Terry, 29 W New Eng L Rev at 422-23 (cited in note 2) (discussing the term "medical
tourism" as applying to "travel of patients from less-developed countries seeking superior health
care in industrialized countries").
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healthcare costs in certain countries have increased and the availability of
medical treatments in countries with universal healthcare systems has decreased,
a new type of medical tourism developed. 4 This new form of medical tourism
allows patients who cannot afford or are not eligible to receive medical
treatments in their home countries to travel internationally for medical
treatment.
Many factors have contributed to the development of the medical tourism
industry. The US serves as an example of a country with expensive, privatized
healthcare and insurance, which drives the medical tourism industry with un- or
under-insured patients looking for high quality, affordable healthcare." Medical
tourists from the UK may travel for treatments for which the time delay for
available treatment in the UK is lengthy." In other situations, medical tourists
may travel from countries with either public or private healthcare systems in
order to obtain treatments not approved in their home countries or for
transplant procedures in destination countries with different systems of organ
distribution." Some medical tourism may occur when patients travel to
countries with public healthcare systems, hoping to obtain treatments funded by
the government.
A. Current and Projected State of the Medical Tourism
Industry
The exact number of patients traveling internationally for medical
treatment is unknown, although a number of provider countries and consulting
firms have made estimates of the numbers. In 2003, approximately 350
thousand patients traveled from industrialized nations to developing countries
for healthcare.' 9 In 2007, approximately 750 thousand American patients

14

15

16

See id ("Today, however, it is more likely that the journey is reversed, as patients travel from
industrialized countries to less-developed nations."). See also Thomas R. McLean, The Global
Market for Health Care: Economics and Regulation, 26 Wis Intl L J 591, 597-98 (2008) ("[T]oday's
patients care more about avoiding bankruptcy and the ability to purchase convenient healthcare
services.").
See generally, The GlobaliZation of Health Care: Can Medical Tourism Reduce Health Care Costs?, Hearing
before the Special Committee on Aging, 109th Cong, 2d Sess (2006).
See Terry, 29 W New Eng L Rev at 423 (cited in note 2) (discussing patients who travel to avoid
healthcare rationing in their home countries).

17

18
19

Mark S. Kopson, Fight or Fkght: Medical Tourisms Implicationsfor Providersand Plans §3(B), American
Health Lawyers Association, AHLA-PAPERS P10260908 (Oct 26, 2009).
See Terry, 29 W New Eng L Rev at 427 (cited in note 2) (discussing problems that arise when
medical tourists look to destination countries to fund their healthcare).
Michael D. Horowitz and Jeffrey A. Rosensweig, Medical Tourism--Health Care in the Global
at
Nov
1,
2007),
online
(The
Physician
Executive
Economy
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traveled abroad for medical treatment.2 0 And in 2004, India provided medical
treatment for about 1.18 million foreign patients and Thailand provided medical
treatment for 1.1 million foreign patients.2 1 Another study by global consulting
firm McKinsey & Company indicated that in 2008, only between 60 thousand to
85 thousand patients traveled abroad specifically for medical treatment.
However, the study excluded patients traveling for outpatient care and travelers
to contiguous countries, which may explain the comparatively low estimate.2 3
The potential for industry growth, however, receives universal agreement.
McKinsey estimated a potential US market of 500 thousand to 700 thousand
medical tourists, if insurance providers offered foreign healthcare options.2 4
Deloitte predicted a potential upper bound on the US market of 1.6 million
medical tourists seeking healthcare outside of the US by 2012.25
The statistics of destination hospitals show that medical tourism is a large
industry on an international scale. Numerous countries promote medical tourism
specialties such as cosmetic surgery, and others offer comprehensive vacation
packages that combine medical treatment with recreational activities.
Bumrungrad, one of the largest providers of medical tourism services in
Thailand, provided healthcare services for 400 thousand international patients in
2010.26 Frost & Sullivan, a consulting firm, estimates the current international
medical tourism market to be worth $78 billion.27 It estimates that approximately
3 million patients traveled internationally for healthcare in 2010.28

20
21

http://www.thefreelibrary.com/Medical
tourism--health care in the global economy.a0172451436 (visited Apr 9, 2011).
Harish Baliga, Medical Tourism is the New Wave of Outsourcingfrom India, India Daily (Dec 23, 2006),
online at http://www.indiadaily.com/editorial/14858.asp (visited Apr 9,2011).
Horowitz and Rosensweig, Medical Tourism (cited in note 19).

2

Tilman Ehrbeck, Ceani Guevara, and Paul D. Mango, Mapping the Marketfor Medical Travel, The
McKinsey
Quarterly
(May
2008),
online
at
http://www.mckinseyquarterly.com/Mapping-the-market for-travel-2134 (visited Apr 9, 2011).

23

Kopson, Fight or Flght at §1 (cited in note 17).
Ehrbeck, Guevara, and Mango, Mapping the Market (cited in note 22).
Deloitte Center for Health Solutions, Medical Toutirm: Update and Implicationsat 3 (cited in note 1).
Bumrungrad International, FAQs (2011), online at http://www.bumrungrad.com/overseas-

24
25
26
27

28

medical-care/faq-s.aspx#Q7 (visited Apr 9, 2011).
William Sykes, Medical Tourism Set to Top 3100 Billon by 2012, eGlobal Travel Media (Dec 15,
2010), online at http://www.eglobaltravelnews.com.au/2-headline-news/medical-tourism-set-totop-100-billion-by-2012.htrml (visited Apr 9, 2011).

Id.
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B. Accreditation and Other Current Regulatory Methods
Safety is an important factor to patients traveling internationally for
medical treatment. Currently, no single, authoritative international healthcare
accreditation body exists. Certain accreditation bodies are prominent in different
geographical regions. In the US, the Joint Commission International, a sector of
a US non-profit accreditation organization, has accredited over 300 international
healthcare facilities.2 9 In the UK and EU, the Trent Accreditation Scheme,
recently reorganized as QIA Trent, provides accreditation to international
hospitals. 0 The Australian Council on Healthcare Standards International also
provides accreditation services to international hospitals. 31 Other accreditation
bodies operate in different regions.32
The WHO has recognized the need for accrediting bodies in order to
ensure healthcare safety, but it has not advocated for a single, unified
accreditation board or standard.3 3 Since accreditation is part of a holistic
approach to medical treatment, encompassing not only medical treatment
standards but also ethical considerations and medical research, the lack of a
unified standard is reasonable. Instead, the WHO works with the Joint

29

Joint

30

32

QHA
Trent, More about the QHA
Group (2010), online
at http://www.qhainternational.co.uk/about-us (visited Apr 9, 2011). See also International Medical Travel Journal:
News, UK Trent hospital accreditation system reborn as QHA (June 10, 2010), online at
http://www.imt).com/news/?Entryld82=206991 (visited April 9, 2011) ("[QH-A] was formed
after the NHS-based organisation Trent Accreditation Scheme (TAS) made the decision to
withdraw from all hospital accreditation-related activities."); Healthcare Beyond Boundaries, Trent
Accreditation Scheme
(2011), online
at
http://www.healthbase.com/resources/medicaltourism/accreditations-and-standards/trent-accreditation-scheme-or-tas.html
(visited Apr 3,
2011) ("[TAS] has been successfully implemented in overseas markets such as Hong Kong since
1999, and more recently has expanded to include hospitals in the Philippines, Malta and
Cyprus.").
Australian Council on Healthcare Standards International, Accreditaion, online at
http://www.achs.org.au/ACHSlaccred/ (visited Apr 9, 2011).
See, for example, The International Society for Quality in Healthcare, Accreditaion (2011) online at

33

http://www.isqua.org/accreditations.htm
(visited Apr 9, 2011); Accreditation Canada
International,
Brochure,
A
World
Leader,
online
at
http://www.accreditation.ca/uploadedFiles/World%/20Leader%/2Obrochure/
20EN.pdf (visited
Apr 9, 2011).
World Health Organization, Management Effectiveness Iniiadves: Role of WHO in hospital accreditaion

31

Commission
International,
About
http://www.jointcommissioninternational.org/about-jci/

]CI
(2009),
(visited Mar 14, 2011).

online

at

(2004), online at http://www.emro.who.int/mei/HARole.htm (visited Apr 9, 2011) (discussing
development of a model for hospital accreditation that is adaptable to regional needs).
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Commission International to promote patient safety standards through its
Collaborating Centre.
Currently, no country prohibits medical tourism by law. Many countries
provide advisory information to citizens traveling for medical tourism.35 The
WHO recognizes the need for additional research into the medical tourism
industry," but has not provided advisory information beyond the information
generally available nationally.
III. ANTIBIOTIc-RESISTANT BACTERIA
Certain diseases have historically been the target of international concern.
Over 150 years ago, countries agreed that diseases such as cholera could not be
competently managed on a national scale, and as new diseases have emerged and
medical science has improved, international regulation of infectious diseases has
broadened." Although antibiotic-resistant bacteria have spread internationally,
they are not highly communicable outside a healthcare setting. However, with
the rise of medical tourism, antibiotic-resistant bacteria may spread between
healthcare facilities across international borders when patients receive follow-up
care in their home countries. This additional mechanism for spreading disease
makes antibiotic-resistant bacteria more closely resemble the types of infectious
diseases that qualify as pandemic diseases under the current International Health
Regulations.
A. Attributes and Examples of Antibiotic-Resistant Bacteria
As antibiotics became the prevalent method for combating infectious
disease, resistance to antibiotic treatment began to arise in certain bacterial
34

Joint Commission International, WHO Collaborating Centre for Patient Safety and High 5s Iniiative
(2009), online at http://www.jointcommissionintemational.org/WHO-Collaborating-Centre-forPatient-Safety-Solutions/ (visited Apr 9, 2011).

3

See, for example, Christie M. Reed, The Pre-Travel Consultation Counseig and Adice for Travelers:
Medical Tourism in Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Travelers' Health-Yellow Book,
at
27,
2009),
online
Tourism
(July
Medical
http://wwwnc.cdc.gov/travel/yellowbook/2010/chapter-2/medical-tourism.aspx (visited Apr 9,
online
at
Service,
Treatment
Abroad,
2011);
National
Health
(visited Apr
http://www.nhs.uk/Livewell/Treatmentabroad/Pages/treatmentabroadhome.aspx
9,2011).

36

Matthias Helble, The Movement of Patients across Borders: Challenges and Opportunitiesfor Public Health
26,
2010),
online
at
Health
Organization
Nov
(Bulletin
of the
World
http://www.who.int/bulletin/volumes/89/1/10-076612/en/ (visited Apr 9, 2011) (discussing
the medical tourism industry and advocating for additional scientific research in the area).

3

For a comprehensive discussion of the evolution of the International Health Regulations, see
generally David P. Fidler, From International Sanitary Conventions to Global Health Searity: The New
InternationalHealth Regulations, 4 Chinese J Intl L 325 (2005).
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strains.38 Bacteria develop resistance naturally, but this development occurs more
quickly when antibiotics are introduced to kill the bacteria. Bacteria with no
resistance die, and bacteria with genetic mutations that fight the antibiotic
survive, increasing the presence of the genetic mutation when the surviving
bacteria reproduce. Bacteria also pass genes by conjugation, which allows
antibiotic-resistant genetic mutations to pass through bacterial populations more
quickly." Overuse of antibiotics, which means use of the drugs when not
medically necessary, and underuse, which concerns noncompliance with
treatment and inadequate dosages, accelerate the development of resistance.4
Increased global trade and travel are recognized by the WHO as factors
that increase the spread of infectious disease and necessitate an increase in global
use of antibiotics.4 ' Antibiotic use is different in every country and depends on a
large number of factors, including the regulatory environment. 42 Regulatory
environments that may promote the development of antibiotic infections are:
the ability to obtain antibiotics without a prescription, including availability
though internet purchase; lack of quality control for available drugs; and patients
that lack funding to pay for full treatment courses.43 Hospitals are particularly
sensitive to the dangers of antibiotic resistance, since they have a combination of
infection-susceptible patients and high rates of antibiotic use."
Two types of antibiotic-resistant bacteria serve as representative examples
of the dangers of widespread antibiotic resistance: MRSA and NDM-1.
1. Emergence, spread, and economic costs of MRSA.
The spread of MRSA since its emergence in the UK in 1961 illustrates the
important role that increased global trade and travel play in the spread of
antibiotic-resistant traits in bacteria. In addition to emergence through high rates

38

World Health Organization, WH-lO Global Strateg for Containment ofAntimicrobialResistance 1 (2001),
online at http://www.who.int/drugresistance/WHO
GlobalStrategyEnglish.pdf (visited Apr
9,2011).

3

See Leslie Pray, Antibiotic Resistance, Mutation Rates and MRSA, The Tip of the Antibioic-Resistance
Icebeg, 1 Nature Educ 1 (2008), online at http://www.nature.com/scitable/topicpage/AntibioticResistance-Mutation-Rates-and-MRSA-28360 (visited Apr 10, 2011) (describing the process of
genetic mutation that leads to antibiotic resistance).
World Health Organization, Global Strateg for Containment at 15 (cited in note 38) (discussing the
relationship between antimicrobial resistance and over- and under-use of antimicrobial agents).
Id at 56.

40

41
42

Id at 3 ("Antimicrobial use ... is influenced by an interplay of the knowledge, expectations and
interactions of prescribers and patients, economic incentives, characteristics of the health
system(s), and the regulatory environment.").

43

Id at 21-23.

44

World Health Organization, GlobalStrateg for Containmentat 31 (cited in note 38).
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of antibiotic use,4 s patients have transmitted MRSA strains internationally
through contact in healthcare settings. The development of MRSA strains is
often characterized as national or international; the similarity of international
MRSA strains indicates that transmission occurred through patient contact in
healthcare settings. 6 At first, scientists believed that methicillin resistance
developed in a single strain and all MRSA strains developed from the initial
bacteria. Later studies show that MRSA types have developed independently. 47
Although the origins of MRSA are not precisely known, one study has indicated
that some major MRSA strains are genetically related, and the most successful
genetic mutations have created families of resistant bacteria.4 8 This dual method
of emergence and transmission indicates that MRSA may be effectively fought
by ensuring both preventing development of new strains through effective use
of antibiotics, and by preventing the spread of existing infections.
The economic costs of MRSA are high. US statistics provide an example of
how MRSA affects a healthcare system. In 2003, almost two-thirds of hospital
staphylococcus aureus infections in intensive care units were antibiotic
resistant. 49 These hospital MRSA infections cause patients to require longer
hospital stays for infection treatment and increase the mortality rate. Additional
45

See Jane D. Siegel, et al, Management of Multidrug-Resistant Organisms In Healthcare Settngs, 2006 16
at
2006),
online
for
Disease
Control
(Center
http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/dhqp/pdf/ar/mdroGuideine2006.pdf (visited Apr 9, 2011):
This effort [to prevent evolution and transmission of MRSA] ... focuses on
effective antimicrobial treatment of infections, use of narrow spectrum agents,
treatment of infections and not contaminants, avoiding excessive duration of
therapy, and restricting use of broad-spectrum or more potent antimicrobials
to treatment of serious infections when the pathogen is not known or when
other effective agents are unavailable.

46

See Mark C. Enright, et al, The Evolutionary History of Methidln-Resistant Staphylococcus aureus
(MRSA), 99 Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the USA 7687, 7687 (May 21,
2002), online at http://www.pnas.org/content/99/11/7687.full.pdf+html (visited Apr 9, 2011)
("Many studies have characterized MRSA isolates from individual hospitals or countries and have
identified strains that appear to be well adapted to the hospital environment, are established in
several hospitals within a country, or have spread internationally (epidemic MRSA, EMRSA).").

47

Id.

48

Id:
The origins of the major MRSA clones are still poorly understood. Kreiswirth
et al. proposed that all MRSAs were descended from a single ancestral S.
aureus strain that acquired mecA, but more recent studies show that some
MRSAs are very divergent, implying that mecA has been transferred between S.
aureus lineages. The data from MLST can be used to probe the evolutionary
and population biology of bacterial pathogens and to predict ancestral
genotypes and patterns of evolutionary descent within groups of related
genotypes.

49

Klevens, et al, 298 J Am Med Assoc at 1763 (cited in note 5) ("The proportion of hospital-onset S
aureus infections that were methicillin-resistant reached 64.4% in US intensive care units in
2003.').
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and more intensive treatment increases economic healthcare costs.o Infections
from methicillin-susceptible staphylococcus aureus (MSSA) increased median
hospital stay costs for patients (MSSA infections are more difficult to treat than
average bacteria, but do not have complete antibiotic resistance), and MRSA
infections tripled the hospital stay costs. 51 The Center for Disease Control
(CDC) relies on studies estimating the frequency of MRSA infections in the US
at approximately 0.03 percent, causing over 90 thousand infections and almost
20 thousand deaths in 2005.52 At two hospitals, MRSA infections raised costs by
$240 thousand annually.5 3 In 2005, the excess costs of MRSA on the US
healthcare system have been estimated as high as $9.5 billion, excluding patient
costs of pain and lost economic value for time spent in the hospital.54
Although the US numbers are high, MRSA infection rates and costs vary
widely across nations. The UK has one of the highest MRSA infection rates in
Europe, and the British National Audit Office estimated that in 2000, nine
percent of hospital patients acquired MRSA infections.s Statistics for other EU
countries show a much lower incidence rate.

50

Id ("In the hospital, MRSA infections are associated with greater lengths of stay, higher mortality,
and increased costs.").

s1

John J. Engemann, et al, Adverse Cinical and Economic Outcomes Attributable to Methiciln Resistance
among Patients wdth Staphylococcus aureus Sutgical Site Infection, 36 Clinical Infectious Diseases 592, 592
(Mar 1, 2003) ("Median hospital charges were $29,455 for control subjects, $52,791 for patients
with MSSA SSI, and $92,363 for patients with MRSA SSI (P .001 for all group comparisons).
Patients with MRSAS SI had a 1.19-fold increase in hospital charges (P = .03) and had mean
attributable excess charges of $13,901 per SSI compared with patients who had MSSA SSIs.").
Klevens, et al, 298 J Am Med Assoc at 1769 (cited in note 5) ("[WJe estimate that 94 360 invasive

52

MRSA infections occurred in the United States in 2005; these infections were associated with
death in 18 650 cases. The standardized incidence rate of invasive MRSA for calendar year 2005
was 31.8 per 100 000 persons.').
s3

Engemann, et al, 36 Clinical Infectious Diseases at 597 (cited in note 51) ("During the cohort
period, among patients with S. aureus SSI, methicillin resistance was responsible for a total excess
cost of $240,289 per year at the 2 study institutions.").

5

Eili Klein, David L. Smith, and Ramanan Laxminarayan, HospitakiZations and Deaths Caused by
Methiilhn-Resistant Staphylococcus aureus, UnitedStates, 1999-2005, 13 Emerging Infectious Diseases J
1840, 1844 (Dec 2007), online at http://www.cdc.gov/EID/content/13/12/pdfs/1840.pdf
(visited Apr 9, 2011):
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Several studies have estimated that antimicrobial drug-resistant infections
increase death, illness, and direct costs by 30/o--100%. Estimates of the excess
cost of an infection with MRSA compared with an infection with methicillinsensitive S. aureus range from z$3,000 to $35,000. This suggests that MRSA
cost the healthcare system (patients and hospitals) an extra $830 million-$9.7
billion in 2005, even without taking into account indirect costs related to
patient pain, illness, and time spent in the hospital.
Rory Clements, What is the Truth About the MRSA Superbug?, Mail Online, online at
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/health/article-157079/What-truth-MRSAsuperbug.htrnl#ixzzl9XFViOb5 (visited Apr 9, 2011); see also Lizette Alvarez, British Hospitals
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2. Recent emergence of NDM-1 and its spread through medical
tourism.
In 2010, a study in The Lancet medical journal reported the emergence of a
new antibiotic-resistant bacteria strain called NDM-1." This strain of antibiotic
resistance is particularly dangerous because it is resistant even to treatments
reserved as last resorts, making the strain difficult to combat." The Lancet study
linked the emergence of NDM-1 to both the over- and under-use of antibiotics.
The WHO has endorsed The Lancet results by issuing a press release
acknowledging the necessity of measures to prevent the spread of NDM-1.58
The subsequent spread of NDM-1 to other countries highlights the
changes brought by medical tourism to the spread of antibiotic-resistant bacteria.
After release of The Lancet study, the US CDC announced that three cases of
NDM-1 had been found in the country, "all from patients who received recent
medical care in India, a country where people often travel in search of affordable
healthcare."" These three cases were the first reports of NDM-1 cases in the
US. Because the new antibiotic resistance was discovered during routine testing

56

at
(Aug 14,
2004), online
Struggle to Limit 'Superbug' Infections, NY Times
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9404E7DB153FF937A2575BCOA9629C8B63
(visited Apr 9, 2011) ("Britain has one of the worst rates of hospital-acquired MRSA bloodstream
infections in Europe, second only to Greece.").
See Karthikeyan K. Kumarasamy, et al, Emergence of a new antibiotic resistance mechanism in India,
Pakistan, and the UK a molecular, biological,and epidemiologicalstudy, 10 The Lancet Infectious Diseases
597 (Sept 2010) online at http://www.thelancet.com/journals/laninf/article/PIIS14733099(10)70143-2/fulltext (visited Apr 10, 2011).

57

See Johann D.D. Pitout, The Latest Theat in the War on Antimicrobial Resistance, 10 The Lancet
online
at
2010),
11,
(Aug
578,
578
Diseases
Infectious
(visited
http://www.thelancet.com/journals/laninf/article/PIIS1473-3099(10)70168-7/fulltext#
Apr 10, 2011) (discussing development of resistance to carbapenems, which are often the last line
of effective treatment available for bacterial infections resistant to multiple drugs).

ss

World Health Organization, HO Urges Countries to Take Measures to Combat AntimicrobialResistance
at
online
2010),
20,
Aug
Centre
(Media
(visited
http://www.who.int/mediacentre/news/releases/2010/amr_20100820/en/index.html
Apr 10, 2010) ("An article published in The Lancet Infectious Diseases on 11 August 2010 identified a
new gene that enables some types of bacteria to be highly resistant to almost all antibiotics. The
article has drawn attention to the issue of AMR, and, in particular, has raised awareness of
infections caused by multi-drug resistant bacteria."). The Indian government, however, disputes
this contention. See, for example, Ulterior Motives Could be Behind Superbug Claim: India, Hindustan
Times (Aug 13, 2010), online at http://www.hindustantimes.com/Ulterior-motives-could-bebehind-superbug-claim-India/Articlel-586370.aspx (visited Apr 10, 2011) (interviewing the
Indian Minister of State for Health and arguing that multinational pharmaceutical companies
funded the study, which ignored the prior universal presence of the NDM-1 bacteria).
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Kelland and Hirschler, Scientists FindNew Superbug Spreadingfrom India (cited in note 6).
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at the CDC, it is likely that NDM-1 was not in the US prior to these three
cases. 60
The Lancet study focused on NDM-1 cases in India, Pakistan, Bangladesh,
and Britain. The study found that "several of the British NDM-1 positive
patients had traveled recently to India or Pakistan for hospital treatment,
including cosmetic surgery."" Discovery of the NDM-1 strain was reported in
August 2010, and the three US cases were reported shortly afterward. By
November 2010, additional European cases had been reported. A scientist at the
European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) announced that
seventy-seven cases of NDM-1 had been reported in thirteen countries between
2008 and 2010.62 The ECDC reported that "[a]mong 55 cases with recorded
travel history, 31 had previously traveled or been admitted to a hospital in India
or Pakistan and five had been hospitalised in the Balkan region."6 3 The ECDC
concluded that NDM-1 has been spreading across Europe and is linked to both
a history of healthcare abroad and nosocomial (or healthcare-setting acquired)
transmission." The ECDC expressed particular concern regarding transmission
across national borders:
Carbapenemase-producing strains [NDM-1 bacteria] have been the cause of
country-wide epidemics of healthcare-associated infections in Greece, Israel,
the United States (US), several Latin American countries and China, and of
local outbreaks in Poland and Italy. These epidemic strains ... have been
shown to spread when carried by patients who are transferred between
hospitals. Such introductions into healthcare systems across country borders
have led to international epidemics by secondary local or regional
transmission. 65
There is heightened concern regarding international transmission in light of
the fact that recent medical care appeared to be a significant factor, not just
medical care in another country at any prior point in time. "Most patients with
recent travel had been hospitalized in a foreign country during the 30 days prior

60

61
62

63

Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Detection of EnterobacteriaceaeIsolates Carying MetalloBeta-Lactamase- United States, 2010, 59 Morbidity and Mortality Wkly Rep 750, 750 (Jun 25, 2010)
(reporting identification of NDM-1 in three 2010 cases during routine testing and alerting
clinicians to possible NDM-1 infections in patients who received recent medical care in India or
Pakistan).
Kelland and Hirschler, Scientists FindNew Superbug SpreadingfromIndia (cited in note 6).
Kate Kelland, 'Super Superbug" NDM-1 Spreads in Europe, Reuters (Nov 17, 2010), online at
http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/11/17/us-superbug-ndm-idUSTRE6AG1AJ20101117
(visited Apr 10, 2011).
Marc J. Struelens, et al, New Delhi Metallo-beta-lactamase 1-produdng Enterobacteiaceae:Emergence and
Response in Europe, 15 Eurosurveillance 1, 1 (Nov 18, 2010).
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to the detection of NDM-1."" Transmission of antibiotic-resistant bacteria
through patient travel between healthcare settings is a new development, driven
by the increase in global travel and trade. NDM-1 exemplifies the potential
dangers of international spread.
B. Attributes of Antibiotic-Resistant Bacteria Compared to
Attributes of Other Pandemic Infectious Diseases
Antibiotic-resistant bacteria have not historically been considered
pandemic infectious diseases, since they are not communicable via airborne
transmission like influenzas and other highly contagious infectious diseases.
Additionally, the methods of preventing transmission and containing infections
for antibiotic-resistant bacteria differ from the methods used for pandemic-type
diseases.
1. Risk factors for infection and transmission of antibiotic-resistant
bacteria compared to other infectious diseases.
Most antibiotic-resistant bacteria, like MRSA, primarily exist in healthcare
settings. "The most common health care risk factors among cases with
[healthcare associated] infections [are] a history of hospitalization, history of
surgery, long-term care residence, and MRSA infection or colonization." 7
Community-associated cases, which are not as common as healthcare-associated
infections, typically have risk factors common with institutional settings such as
schools, athletic facilities, and jails. These risk factors include: "close skin-to-skin
contact, openings in the skin such as cuts or abrasions, contaminated items and
surfaces, crowded living conditions, and poor hygiene." 68 Notably, transmission
requires direct skin-to-skin contact or surface contamination, but antibioticresistant bacteria do not tend to survive for more than a few minutes on
contaminated surfaces. Without long periods of transmission through surface
contamination or airborne transmission, antibiotic-resistant bacteria do not tend
to spread rapidly outside healthcare or institutional settings. Casual contact, such
as hugging, is usually acceptable for visitors of an infected patient, as long as
contact with the wound site is avoided.
Pandemic outbreaks, on the other hand, are more often associated with
infectious diseases with transmission methods that are more difficult to monitor
6

Idat3.

67

Klevens, et al, 298 J Am Med Assoc at 1767 (cited in note 5) (parentheses omitted).
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Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, People at Risk of Acquiring MRSA Infecdons, Skin
online
at
2010),
9,
(Aug
Community
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in
Infections
http://www.cdc.gov/mrsa/riskfactors/index.htmil (visited Apr 9, 2011).
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and control. The 2009 H1N1 influenza, which was declared a pandemic by the
WHO, "transmitted through: [d]roplet exposure of mucosal surfaces by
respiratory secretions from coughing or sneezing; [c]ontact, usually of hands,
with an infectious patient or [contaminated surface] followed by self-inoculation
... ; and [s]mall particle aerosols in the vicinity of the infectious individual."o In
addition to rapid transmission contact factors, other attributes make the
influenza virus particularly susceptible to rapid population spread. "Influenza
viruses are notorious for their rapid mutation and unpredictable behaviour.,71
Medical tourism provides a tool of rapid transmission across international
borders for antibiotic-resistant bacteria that did not exist before this century.
Although pandemic outbreaks have many factors that make them prone to rapid
transmission, the introduction of a cross-border transmission factor for diseases
that are particularly resistant to treatment may be especially dangerous.
2. Containment and transmission prevention methods for antibioticresistant bacteria compared to pandemic-type infectious diseases.
Since antibiotic-resistant bacteria spread by different methods than
pandemic-type infectious diseases, it follows that the methods for containing
and preventing transmission of antibiotic-resistant bacteria differ from the
methods for containing pandemic-type infectious diseases.
The most common transmission prevention method for healthcareassociated MRSA is hospital screening policies. These policies generally require
the hospital to request information before admission regarding the patient's
exposure to certain high-risk healthcare settings, such as intensive care units.7 2 In
the Netherlands, hospital preadmission questionnaires, which typically ask about
exposure to healthcare settings and previous MRSA infections, also ask if the
patient has been treated in a foreign hospital.7 1 "In the Dutch opinion, all
foreign hospitals are considered suspected for harboring MRSA." 74 Once the

70

71

72

Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Interim Guidance on Infection ControlMeasuresfor 2009
H1N1 Influenta in Healthcare Settings, Including Protection of Healthcare Personnel,Modes of 2009 H1N1
InfluenZa
Transmission
(July
15,
2010),
online
at
http://www.cdc.gov/h1nlflu/guidelines infection-control.htm (visited Apr 9, 2011).
World Health Organization, InfluenZa A(H1N1), Statement by WHO Director-General,Dr Margaret
Chan
(Media
Centre,
Apr
29,
2009),
online
at
http://www.who.int/mediacentre/news/statements/2009/h1n1_20090429/en/index.htmil
(visited Apr 9, 2011).
David H. Wyllie, Tim E.A. Peto, and Derrick Crook, MRSA Bacteraemia in Paients on Arnival in

Hospital: a Cohort Study in Oxfordshire 1997-2003, 331 Brit Med J 992, 993 (Oct 29, 2005).
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Johan H.T. Wagenvoort, et al, Once MRSA, Always MRSA? Setting up a Hospital Preadmission
Questionnaire,21 Infection Control & Hospital Epidemiology 251, 251 (April 2000).
Id.
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initial risk for exposure is determined, hospitals provide various levels of
isolation to prevent transmission. 7' New methods of preventing transmission of
antibiotic-resistant bacteria include: "antibiotic control ..

.;

selective digestive

decontamination to reduce endogenous infections in high-risk, critically ill
patients; or more widespread use and promotion of hand antisepsis rather than
conventional hand washing to prevent cross-infections."7 These infection
containment methods illustrate the low risk of transmission without direct
contact. Containment methods for antibiotic-resistant bacteria are largely
dependent upon hospital rules and practices.
For pandemic-type infectious diseases, "[t]he infectious characteristics of
pandemic influenza will not be known until after it emerges. Consequently,
infection control plans will have to be adapted to the current knowledge of
transmission and updated as new information becomes available."77 However,
transmission typically occurs via "airborne, droplet, or contact transmission."7 1
Standard precautions against these types of transmission include:
The use of gloves and facial protection by healthcare workers when
providing care to coughing/sneezing patients. Hand hygiene before and
after patient contact, and after removing gloves . . . performed either by

using an alcohol-based hand rub or by washing hands with soap and
water .... Standard operating procedures to handle and disinfect patient
care equipment, patient rooms, and soiled linen; prevent needlestick/sharp
injuries; and address environmental cleaning, spills-management, and
handling of waste.79
These types of precautions illustrate the difficulties in containing
pandemic-type infectious diseases outside of the hospital setting, where contact
with infected persons might include coughing and sneezing or casual contact,
but is less likely to include direct contact with infected abrasions. In a hospital
setting, healthcare workers have access to gloves, facial protection, and
handwashing facilities. Outside the hospital setting, individuals may not have
access to these types of tools to prevent transmission. However, the extensive
transmission prevention procedures required for pandemic-type infectious
diseases show that current containment methods may be economically costly.

7s

76

Id.
Andreas F. Widmer, Hugo Sax, and Didier Pittet, Infection Control and HospitalEpidemiolo
the United States, 20 Infection Control & Hospital Epidemiology 17, 20 (Jan 1999).
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Occupational Safety and Health Administration, Pandemic InfluenZa Preparedness and Response
Guidancefor Healtbcare Workers and HealtbcareEmployers, US Dept of Labor, OSHA Doc No 332805R, 15 (2009).
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IV. APPLICATION OF THE IHR To ANTIBIOTIC-RESISTANT
BACTERIA
In order for the IHR to provide a possible solution to the problem of
transmission of antibiotic resistant bacteria transmission through medical
tourism, the regulations must first apply to the problem. The WHO's
jurisdiction over international public health is broadly written, but the WHO has
traditionally limited application of its jurisdiction in light of political, social and
economic concerns. 0 The general history and purpose of the IHR indicate that
it should be applied to an international health problem of high social and
economic concern, like transmission of antibiotic-resistant bacteria through
medical tourism. In addition, the regulatory language literally applies to the
situation as well.
A. The History of the IHR
The IHR evolved out of international concern regarding sanitation and
environments conducive to diseases with danger of international spread.
Previous regulations included only a limited list of diseases, including cholera,
yellow fever, and plague, but the IHR has since expanded to broad language
encompassing a range of different diseases." As David Fidler explains:
[The] WHO widened the risks the revised IHR would cover to include more
than infectious diseases. The first indication of this move [came] in
February 2001, when WHO discussed in its IHR revision progress report
how [the WHO's Global Outbreak Alert and Response Network] could be
designed to "provide information on noncommunicable diseases and
environmental, chemical or nuclear risks." 82
Fidler's explication of the history, development, and purpose of the IHR
provides a useful basis for examining their application to antibiotic-resistant

bacteria.

8

81
82

Lindsay F. Wiley, Moting GlobalHealth Law Upstream: A CriticalAppraisal of Global Health Law as a
Tool for Health Adaptation to Cmate Change, 22 Georgetown Intl Envir L Rev 439, 461 (2010)
("Although the World Health Assembly [} (the governing body of the WHO) has notably broad
legislative and regulatory powers under the WHO Constitution, it has generally refrained from
using them.").
Fidler, 4 Chinese J Intl L at 328-29 (cited in note 37).
Id at 351, citing Revision of the International Health Regulations, Progress Report, Februay 2001, 76
Wdy Epidemiological Rec 61, 62 (2001).
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1. Expansion from member
regulatory structure.

state

reporting

requirements

to

The IHR has expanded from information-dissemination requirements with
no regulatory structure, allowing individual states to protect themselves, into a
single set of international rules, allowing states to cooperate in order to pursue
protection from international disease transmission in the most efficient and
effective possible method. "The classical regime pursued protection against the
international spread of infectious diseases through international legal obligations
requiring that (1) States notify other countries about outbreaks of specified
diseases; and (2) [States] maintain adequate public health capabilities at points of
disease entry and exit."" The classical regime was designed to give minimal
interference into national affairs. "The goal [of the classical regime] was to
structure State responses to infectious disease outbreaks in other countries so
that States could protect themselves from disease importation and spread in
ways that were scientifically effective and the least restrictive of trade and travel
possible."" Of particular concern were diseases spreading from Asia and Africa
to Western states. The two presumptions implicit in the classical regime were
that individual states were capable of structuring state regulations that would
prevent disease transmission, and that each state was the best decision-maker
regarding the balance of economic restrictions in exchange for disease
transmission prevention.
a) The 1948 WHO Constitution. In 1948, the WHO Constitution was
adopted, and its language drastically changed the setting for application of
international regulation to infectious disease transmission.
The procedural changes effected by the WHO Constitution created the
possibility for [the] WHO to adopt one set of international legal rules to
replace the patchwork of international sanitary conventions and to revise
and amend such rules efficiently in response to changes in scientific or other
factors. In addition, the WHO Constitution's 'opt out' technique would
help ensure that the single set of rules would be widely applicable in the
international system.85
This change allowed the WHO to broaden its regulations beyond simple
reciprocal information reporting requirements and to provide a set of reciprocal
standard regulations to all countries that opted in to compliance. Significantly,
the constitutional expansion also allowed reporting information from parties
other than the Member State." "[he new IHR containfed] a vision of
8

Id at 329 (parentheses omitted).
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Id at 330.
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Fidler, 4 Chinese J Intl L at 332-33 (cited in note 37).
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Id at 346.
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integrated governance for global public health because the proposals connect
public health objectives with principles and norms found in international law on
trade, human rights, environmental protection and security." 87
b) The shift from International Sanitary Regulations to a health-based regulatoU
approach. Prior to the adoption of the IHR, the classical regime relied upon
sanitary regulations to control infectious disease. "The International Sanitary
Regulations (ISR), adopted in 1951, were based on an approach to the legal
control of infectious disease that dated back to at least the mid-nineteenth
century."8 Since infectious diseases tended to emerge in countries with poor
sanitary conditions, industrialized nations could protect themselves from
pandemics by controlling travel and trade at their own national borders. "For
more than a century, the notification requirements that triggered an international
response (primarily relying on travel and trade restrictions to control the spread
of disease) were applicable only to a short list of named infectious diseases,
principally cholera, plague, and yellow fever."" The three diseases included in
the ISR were the known diseases at the time that now best fit the pandemic-type
infectious disease model. "The list shifted slightly with the adoption of the ISR
in 1951 and a series of minor revisions, and the ISR were retooled as the IHR in
1969, but the basic approach remained the same." 0 As medical knowledge
regarding infectious disease grew, and more pandemic-type infectious diseases
were discovered, the ISR expanded to include more diseases for possible
national restrictions.
After the ISR began expanding to include additional diseases, the WHO
adopted the original version of the International Health Regulations. The
original regulations adopted the classical regime of reporting and national
regulation, which also became ineffective:
[F]or a variety of reasons, the IHR became largely irrelevant to the realities
of infectious disease control in practice. Rapid increase in the speed of
travel and trade made quarantine and isolation provisions far less effective,
and advances in medical technologies, especially the development of
antibiotics and vaccines, required a fundamentally different approach to
fighting disease. Later, several new developments left [the] WHO looking
flat-footed, as many criticized its lack of leadership on new threats to health.
These issues included the emergence of HIV/AIDS as one of the worst
pandemics in history, the growing burdens of other infectious diseases like
malaria and tuberculosis, and the proliferation of biological weapons.91
87

Id at 343.
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Wiley, 22 Georgetown Intl Envir L Rev at 462 (cited in note 80).
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These problems led to a revision process of the IHR.
2. Expansion from a limited to expansive definition of the term
"disease."
The WHO entered into a ten-year process of negotiation to develop a new
version of the IHR. The WHO adopted the revisions in 2005. The revised IHR
was put into force in 2007. "The new IHR's purpose is 'to prevent, protect
against, control and provide a public health response to the international spread
of disease in ways that are commensurate with and restricted to public health
risks and which avoid unnecessary interference with international traffic and
trade."' 9 2 Although the purpose of the new IHR was similar to the purpose of
the original ISR, it contained an important change in focus. The inclusion of
broad language applying "to all 'public health emergencies of international
concern,' include[d] not only infectious disease outbreaks, but also chemical and
radio-nuclear events and perhaps other threats to health as well."93 This broad
language, although typically interpreted as an expansion beyond solely the threat
of disease, also means that the IHR applies beyond just the traditionally
presented pandemic-type diseases and the influenza virus outbreaks that are
often declared pandemics (such as SARS or H1N1 influenza). The WHO further
clarified that "[a] 'public health emergency of international concern' is defined as
'an extraordinary event which is determined ... : (i) to constitute a public health
risk to other States through the international spread of disease; and (ii) to
potentially require a coordinated international response."' In particular,
.'[d]isease' is defined quite broadly as 'an illness or medical condition,
irrespective of origin or source, that presents or could present significant harm
to humans."' 94 The historical development of the IHR indicates that it is meant
to be interpreted broadly, and the current use of the term "disease" is meant to
include antibiotic-resistant bacteria.
B. The Purpose of the IHR
According to the WHO, the IHR serves two main goals: the development
of a framework for coordination of public health emergencies of international
concern and improvement of every nation's ability to manage public health

92

Wiley, 22 Georgetown Intl Envir L Rev at 462 (cited in note 88), citing World Health
Organization, IHR, Art 2 (2005) (cited in note 8).

93

Id at 463.

94

Id.

294

TVol. 12 No. 1

The Spread ofAntibiotic-ResistantBacteria

Hill

threats." The innovations under the revised IHR reflect their broad purpose,
including:
(a) a scope not limited to any specific disease or manner of transmission,
but covering "illness or medical condition, irrespective of origin or source,
that presents or could present significant harm to humans"; (b) State Party
obligations to develop certain minimum core public health capacities; (c)
obligations on States Parties to notify [the] WHO of events that may
constitute a public health emergency of international concern according to
defined criteria; (d) provisions authorizing [the] WHO to take into
consideration unofficial reports of public health events and to obtain
verification from States Parties concerning such events; (e) procedures for
the determination by the Director-General of a "public health emergency of
international concern" and issuance of corresponding temporary
recommendations, after taking into account the views of an Emergency
Committee; (f) protection of the human rights of persons and travellers; and
(g) the establishment of National IHR Focal Points and WHO IHR Contact
Points for urgent communications between States Parties and [the] WHO. 96
The IHR is meant to encompass all types of diseases, regardless of method of
transmission. In addition, allowing unofficial reports of public health events for
notification prevents member states from limiting the definition of disease via
their own reports. Instead, the IHR places discretion in the hands of the WHO
and its Director-General to determine whether a disease qualifies as a public
health emergency and issue recommendations to member states. This expanded
purpose and retained discretion allow "the IHR [to] remain firmly rooted in a
security-based justification for international cooperation with respect to
health."" Despite the broad language, the purpose of the IHR focuses more
heavily on security, which makes prevention of emergence and transmission of
infectious disease incidental to, though a necessary part of, the purpose of the
IHR. For antibiotic-resistant bacteria and medical tourism, this purpose makes it
likely that the WHO will balance both the public heath factors and the economic
benefits and risks of the medical tourism industry in combination with
antibiotic-resistant bacteria.

9s

World Health Organization, InternadonalHealth Regulations (IHR): About the IHR (2011), online at
http://www.who.int/ihr/about/en/ (visited Apr 10, 2011).
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IHR at 1-2 (cited in note 8). See also Bradly J. Condon and Tapen Sinha, The Effectiveness of
Pandemic Preparations:L.gal Lesson from the 2009 Influenga Epidemic, 22 Fla J Ind L 1, 4 (2010) ('The
IHR (2005) expanded disease coverage, notification requirements, and the sources of information
that the WHO can use regarding disease outbreaks.").
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C. Implementation of the IHR, Including General
Enforceability and Effectiveness
Prior to the revisions of the IHR, the WHO's regulatory structures for
controlling infectious diseases were legal failures:
As early as the late 1960s, WHO officials and other commentators
expressed frustration about the lack of IHR compliance by [member states].
One expert asked, "[I]s there much sense in the maintenance of rules if they
are not observed-if they are disregarded or more or less systematically
broken-without any consequences for those who deviate?"9 8
This concern regarding implementation affected the development of the
revised IHR and continues to affect the WHO's decisions regarding the
declaration of public health emergencies and the appropriate temporary and
standing recommendations. Since "[member states] routinely violated their
obligations to notify WHO of outbreaks of diseases subject to the [IHR] and to
refrain from applying unwarranted measures to the trade and travel coming from
countries suffering such outbreaks,"99 the WHO is using the revised IHR not
only to attempt to change the prior system for regulating public health
emergencies, but also to ensure that member states adequately comply with an
international public health regulatory structure. As such, it is unlikely that the
WHO will embrace regulating antibiotic-resistant bacteria and issuing
recommendations to combat their international spread unless member states
believe compliance is in their own best interest.
D. Application of the IHR
Application of the IHR has exposed flaws in the regulatory structure. The
SARS pandemic, which occurred in 2002 and 2003, exposed the WHO to
potential problems, but since the outbreak occurred before revisions were
complete, many of the problems led to changes in the revision process. The
2009 H1N1 pandemic provides the best example of application of the revised
IHR. Problems arose during H1N1, including the lack of financial assistance to
implement the IHR in developing countries and the lack of effective recourse
for asymmetrical travel and trade restrictions. 0 0
1. Significant new reporting compliance with the IHR.
Although Mexico did not report the H1N1 outbreak as soon as it began,
due to the similarity in symptoms to seasonal influenza, it reported suspected
98

Fidler, 4 Chinese J Intl L at 335 (cited in note 37).
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Id at 335-36.
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cases quickly.'o' Such compliance with IHR regulation is an example of how the
revised IHR has encouraged countries to comply with reporting requirements by
providing incentives like reciprocal reporting requirements and symmetrical
travel and trade restrictions.' 0 2 Modern technology increases incentives for
countries to comply with reporting requirements by making it more likely that
the information will be internationally communicated regardless of the
government decision. If the outbreak is not initially reported by the state, the
government risks receiving bad press alleging inadequate monitoring of
outbreaks or even suppression of information.
2. The WHO's declaration
recommendations.

of

a

pandemic

and

issuance

of

The WHO was willing both to declare a pandemic and issue
recommendations during the H1N1 outbreak, reassuring member states and
commentators who were concerned that the WHO would be hesitant to do so
due to possible non-compliance.0 3 However,
a significant number of countries-from different parts of the world and
with varying levels of economic development-chose to ignore the WHO
DG's recommendations in introducing trade and travel restrictions. In
contrast to the reporting obligation, the WHO DG's recommendations are
not binding. This suggests that non-binding recommendations might not
prove effective in minimizing the economic damage caused by
disproportionate trade and travel restrictions.1 04
Many countries made the unsupported assumption that the H1N1 virus
originated in Mexico, despite a similar number of cases in the US. These
countries responded by issuing asymmetrical travel and trade restrictions against
Mexico.
3. Non-compliance with symmetrical travel and trade restrictions.
Despite its willingness to declare a pandemic and issue recommendations,
"the WTO was remarkably slow to address the disproportionate trade
restrictions, despite being the international organization with jurisdiction over
such matters."' Since reporting requirements are still open to national delay
based on detection, maintalning incentives to report remains important.

101 Id at 5.
102

Id at 11.
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Id at 12 ("[W]hile some might like to see a faster response, this contradicts prior speculation that
the WHO DG would be unwilling to issue recommendations.").
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"Reducing the risk of disproportionate trade restrictions would enhance
economic incentives to comply with surveillance requirements."os
Overall, the H1N1 pandemic provides encouraging evidence that the IHR
may be used to control transmission of antibiotic-resistant bacteria. Though the
host country may not be likely to report an outbreak, other countries are likely to
comply with reporting requirements, since discovery of new antibiotic-resistant
bacteria in patients that have recently traveled to other countries for medical care
would not damage the reporting county's reputation or result in economic
sanctions through travel or trade restrictions. Likewise, the WHO has shown its
willingness to declare a pandemic and issue recommendations. If the WTO and
the WHO continue to respond slowly to asymmetric recommendations between
states, as during the H1N1 pandemic, countries are likely to use asymmetric
response restrictions, since antibiotic-resistant bacteria are likely to affect only
localized areas if they are reported before widespread transmission.
V. TEXTUAL APPLICATION OF THE IHR TO CONTAINMENT OF
ANTIBIOTIc-RESISTANT BACTERIA INFECTIONS
The WHO clearly intended to include antibiotic-resistant bacteria in its
definition of disease. This intention is evidenced by the statement of purpose in
the explanatory foreword to the IHR, the broadly constructed definition of
terms, the guiding principles of interpretation provided by the WHO, and the
recommendations permissible under the IHR.
A. Statement of Purpose
The WHO created its broad definition of disease in part to ensure that a
restricted definition would not become obsolete as new diseases were
discovered. "By not limiting the application of the IHR (2005) to specific
diseases, it is intended that the Regulations will maintain their relevance and
applicability for many years to come even in the face of the continued evolution
of diseases and of the factors determining their emergence and transmission." 07
The IHR explicitly states that "[t]he purpose and scope of these Regulations are
to prevent, protect against, control and provide a public health response to the
international spread of disease in ways that are commensurate with and
restricted to public health risks, and which avoid unnecessary interference with
international traffic and trade."' The purpose does not limit itself to certain
classes or types of disease, and the only limitations placed on prevention
106
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measures are designed to ensure that there is in fact a risk and that the response
taken is economically proportionate to that risk. Under the purpose of the IHR,
the requirements for classifying antibiotic-resistant bacteria as an applicable
disease are: that it might spread internationally, which is likely, considering the
growth of medical tourism; that a risk exists, which is supported by the high cost
of antibiotic-resistant infections; and that the recommended measure must be
proportionate to the risk.
B. Definition of Terms
The defining terms are constructed so that antibiotic-resistant bacteria are
included within their scope. The term "disease," as previously discussed, is
defined broadly as "an illness or medical condition, irrespective of origin or
source that presents or could present significant harm to humans."' 9 Disease,
however, is not the only term that is broadly defined in order to maintain the
wide scope of the IHR. Other terms are likewise defined broadly and therefore
can easily be construed to include antibiotic-resistant bacteria within their scope.
First, the terms that apply directly to the type of disease and carriers are
defined broadly enough to include antibiotic-resistant bacteria and medical
tourist carriers. The term "affected" is defined to include infected persons who
carry sources of infection or contamination,"o which would apply to medical
tourists traveling across national borders with antibiotic-resistant infections.
Similarly, an "ill person" is anyone "suffering from or affected with a physical
ailment that may pose a public health risk.""' Using the term "physical ailment"
instead of a more limited descriptor such as "infectious disease" makes clear that
the WHO intended anything capable of causing physical illness to be actionable
under the IHR. An infection is also broadly defined as "the entry and
development or multiplication of an infectious agent in the body of humans and
animals that may constitute a public health risk,"" 2 which also encompasses
antibiotic-resistant bacteria.
The terms that describe the health threat and recommendations are
similarly broad and are easily construed to include the threat of healthcareassociated antibiotic-resistant bacteria traveling internationally through medical
tourism. The term "event" is similarly not limited to a single geographical and
temporal event; instead, it "means a manifestation of disease or an occurrence
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that creates a potential for disease.""' Unlike pandemics, which develop, spread,
and peak quickly, with definite geographical boundaries defined by patients
showing symptoms, new antibiotic-resistant bacteria may not be discovered
quickly and their spread may be more difficult to locate, since symptoms may
not occur until after travel. The term "public health risk" means "a likelihood of
an event that may affect adversely the health of human populations, with an
emphasis on one which may spread internationally or may present a serious and
direct danger."1 4 This definition includes antibiotic-resistant bacteria, since they
directly threaten health, though not all strains will present the same degree of
danger.
The term "public health emergency of international concern," used
frequently in the IHR, means "an extraordinary event which is determined, as
provided in these Regulations: (i) to constitute a public health risk to other States
through the international spread of disease [and] (ii) to potentially require a
coordinated international response.""' The broad definition has only two
requirements: first, that a disease be capable of spreading across national
borders, as antibiotic-resistant bacteria are through medical tourism; and second,
that a coordinated international response be required, meaning that individual
state restrictions would either be inadequate or less efficient to prevent the
spread of the disease. Since a country already affected by a particular antibioticresistant strain of bacteria would have little incentive to report or contain
antibiotic-resistant bacteria without international reciprocity, the IHR provides
efficient grounds for such compliance.
C. Guiding Principles of Interpretation of the IHR
The WHO provides guiding principles for interpreting the IHR:
1. The implementation of [the IHR] shall be with full respect for the dignity,
human rights and fundamental freedoms of persons. 2. The implementation
of [the IHR] shall be guided by the Charter of the United Nations and the
Constitution of the World Health Organization. 3. The implementation of
these Regulations shall be guided by the goal of their universal application
for the protection of all people of the world from the international spread
of disease. 4. States have, in accordance with the Charter of the United
Nations and the principles of international law, the sovereign right to
legislate and to implement legislation in pursuance of their health policies.
In doing so they should uphold the purpose of [the IHR]." 6
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These principles comport with the idea that antibiotic-resistant bacteria are an
appropriate subject for regulation under the IHR. Allowing member states to
regulate medical tourism and antibiotic-resistant bacteria independently would
lead to asymmetrical travel and trade regulations, particularly against developing
nations. Member states would target developing nations because the factors that
increase the probability of developing new antibiotic-resistant bacteria7 are
more prevalent where less funding and education is available for healthcare. In
addition, regulation by individual states would not help develop infrastructure in
developing nations to prevent over- and under-use of antibiotics. Preventing
development of antibiotic-resistant bacteria where it originates is the
containment method most consistent with the IHR's guiding principle of
protecting all people from disease.
D. Reporting Requirements
The IHR provides a detailed flow chart and descriptive information to help
member states determine what diseases qualify for reporting. Initially, member
states must maintain the "capacity to detect, assess, notify and report events"' 18
and report to the WHO "essential information includ[ing] the following: clinical
descriptions, laboratory results, sources and type of risk, numbers of human
cases and deaths, conditions affecting the spread of the disease and the health
measures employed.""' Using the chart and information, member states must
report all qualifying events to the WHO.12 0
Applying the attributes of antibiotic-resistant bacteria to the flow chart
leads to the conclusion that antibiotic-resistant bacteria capable of international
spread through medical tourism likely qualify for regulation under the IHR.
First, antibiotic-resistant bacteria have a serious impact on public health,121 as
evidenced by the high economic costs of treatment of MRSA in affected
countries.1 2 In addition, indication of treatment failure, including new or
emerging antibiotic resistance, is explicitly given public health impact under the
IHR flow chart. Second, antibiotic resistance is unusual or unexpected, especially
when new resistant strains develop.123 Third, antibiotic-resistant bacteria pose a
significant risk of international spread, since medical tourists are a highly mobile

117 See Section III.A.
118 IHR at 10 (cited in note 8).
119
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population likely to travel internationally while infected.' 24 Fourth, the medical
tourism industry is an appropriate area for international regulation, since medical
tourism is by its nature an area involving a high degree of international travel. 125
Also, the NDM-1 case 2 6 shows that emergence of new antibiotic-resistant
bacteria generates requests for more information by foreign officials and the
international media. The satisfaction of these factors under Annex 2 makes
emergence of a new antibiotic-resistant bacteria in an area of medical tourism
reportable under the IHR.
The incident is also reportable if the confluence of factors would meet the
overall requirements of a public health emergency.
In determining whether an event constitutes a public health emergency of
international concern, the Director-General shall consider: (a) information
provided by the State Party; (b) the decision instrument contained in Annex
2; (c) the advice of the Emergency Committee; (d) scientific principles as
well as the available scientific evidence and other relevant information; and
(e) an assessment of the risk to human health, of the risk of international
spread of disease and of the risk of interference with international traffic. 127
This more general assessment is even more likely to lead to the conclusion that
the emergence of new antibiotic-resistant bacteria in an area of medical tourism
is reportable, since it incorporates the more general purpose and guiding
principles of the IHR.128
E. Other Sources Support the Idea of a Public Health
Emergency to Include Antibiotic-Resistant Bacterial
Infections
Scientific research supports the contentions that antibiotic-resistant
bacteria are no longer difficult to transmit and are best controlled within
individual healthcare environments. The prevalence of community-associated
MRSA and difficulty distinguishing it from healthcare-associated MRSA
illustrate the potential development of antibiotic-resistant bacteria and the need
to prepare for newly emerging methods of transmission, like medical tourism.
Control of community-acquired [antibiotic-resistant bacterial] infection
(coming from all sources that do not include healthcare facilities) and risk
communication (the provision of information and prevention guidance to
the general public) are keys to preventing amplification of contagions in the
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community at the residential and broader community levels. Research shows
that secondary, bacterial infection (co-infection) complications, exacerbated
by influenza-induced immune system suppression, were the primary cause
of death during the 1918 influenza pandemic. This challenges the utility of
viral vaccination programs, and should result in a shifting of present
pandemic planning.129
The presence of potential additional transmission methods demonstrates that
considering the risk of antibiotic-resistant bacteria as a pandemic or as a coinfection to a viral pandemic is essential to proper pandemic planning, which is
the goal of the IHR.
F. Potential Response Measures under the IHR
The IHR obligates member states to "develop, strengthen and maintain ...
the capacity to respond promptly and effectively to public health risks and public
health emergencies of international concern." 3 0 Thus, the response measures
under the IHR are limited to an individual state's ability to comply with the
recommendations. In addition, the WHO may only issue recommendations on
specific subject matters:
Recommendations issued by WHO to States Parties with respect to persons
may include the following advice: no specific health measures are advised;
review travel history in affected areas; review proof of medical examination
and any laboratory analysis; require medical examinations; review proof of
vaccination or other prophylaxis; require vaccination or other prophylaxis;
place suspect persons under public health observation; implement
quarantine or other health measures for suspect persons; implement
isolation and treatment where necessary of affected persons; implement
tracing of contacts of suspect or affected persons; refuse entry of suspect
and affected persons; refuse entry of unaffected persons to affected areas;
and implement exit screening and/or restrictions on persons from affected
areas.131
Many of these recommendations apply to containment of antibiotic-resistant
bacteria, including review of travel history, review of medical or laboratory
information, and quarantine and isolation of affected travelers. These
recommendations may be either temporary or standing recommendations,
depending upon the temporal nature of the outbreak.
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1. Temporary recommendations.
To prevent antibiotic-resistance bacteria transmission, temporary
recommendations, which are only applicable for a specific time period or during
the duration of the outbreak, would be less useful than standing
recommendations. Temporary recommendations "may include health measures
to be implemented by the State Party experiencing the public health emergency
of international concern, or by other States Parties, regarding persons, [etc.,] to
prevent or reduce the international spread of disease and avoid unnecessary
interference with international traffic."' 3 2 The WHO is likely to be more willing
to issue temporary recommendations because of their nonpermanent nature.
Since the IHR requires the WHO to consider the economic repercussions of any
recommendations issued, restrictive recommendations are more likely to be
temporary, allowing regular travel and trade to resume after the outbreak. For
antibiotic-resistant bacteria, the risk of transmission would not diminish until the
new bacteria were actually transmitted internationally--effectively making
temporary recommendations into standing recommendations until the
temporary recommendations fail.
2. Standing recommendations.
Standing recommendations have a greater likelihood of success than
temporary recommendations in containing antibiotic-resistant bacteria over time,
but the WHO may be more hesitant to issue them. Although the WHO has the
same power to make standing recommendations as it has to make temporary
ones,"' the requirement that the recommendations be the least restrictive
possible makes standing recommendations less useful. Thus, potential standing
recommendations would more likely be less restrictive, such as review of travel
history and review of medical records. Since medical tourists (as opposed to
travelers who receive emergency treatment abroad) usually have visas indicating
the medical nature of their trips, standing recommendations of this nature would
be minimally restrictive on travel. In addition, review would allow member states
to conduct testing and provide treatment highly likely to prevent transmission in
domestic hospitals, making this type of recommendation highly effective.
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VI. ALTERNATIVES TO RECOMMENDATIONS UNDER THE IHR
TO PREVENT TRANSMISSION OF ANTIBIOTIC-RESISTANT
BACTERIA
The IHR is not the only tool to help contain antibiotic-resistant bacteria
and monitor the medical tourism industry. Other possibilities include: forgoing a
regulatory scheme and allowing patients to seek the best healthcare per cost,
essentially creating a race-to-the-top scheme for medical tourism hospitals;
purely information-forcing regimes that would cooperate with a race-to-the-top
scheme; and the classical IHR regime of allowing individual countries to regulate
containment procedures for incoming antibiotic-resistant bacteria.
A. No Regulatory or Information-Forcing Regime
If the WHO and individual countries forgo any regulatory or informationforcing regime, the results are likely to lead to widespread international
transmission of new antibiotic-resistant bacteria. This type of regime would
require methods of getting accurate information to patients regarding the
presence of antibiotic-resistant bacteria at destination hospitals. In practice,
countries with strong medical tourism industries have little incentive to release
information regarding emergence of antibiotic-resistant bacteria in their own
country. This leaves other methods of dissemination for this type of
information, none of which is as efficient as member state reporting. Media
dissemination, for example, is dependent upon both adequate scientific research
in the affected country and adequate incentives to give the information to the
media. For scientists receiving government funding or conducting research with
government permission, there may not be adequate incentives to provide this
information to the media as soon as the risk arises. Reporting by other countries
would be similarly inefficient, given that countries would be motivated to report
all emerging resistances as originating in other countries, even if the resistance
had originated in their own. Ultimately, the information reported would be
perceived as unreliable due to political motivations or would actually be
unreliable.
Even if media attention and medical tourism facilitation agencies could
provide sufficient information, patients would not necessarily choose a hospital
in order to minimize the risk of spreading antibiotic-resistant bacteria to their
home country. The patient's determination of destination hospital would include
a number of factors,'m most importantly cost, but the patient would also balance
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a number of risk factors, such as accreditation,s35 malpractice remedies,1 36 and
other patient-protective concerns.137 Patients will seek out destination hospitals
that best manage the combination of these risk factors, and they may find an
acceptable tradeoff between the risk of exposure to antibiotic-resistant bacteria
in exchange for affordable cost or greater potential remedy for complications.
B. Information-Forcing Regimes Only at Either the National
or International Level
The next step toward more regulatory structure offers little help. Even if a
national structure exists to force accurate information at a national or
international level, the same problems with patient choice structures arise.138
Even with accurate information, the patient would not have the proper incentive
to choose medical treatment in a destination country with the lowest risk of
spreading new antibiotic-resistant bacteria. Either some additional incentive or
regulation would have to be in place to induce the patient to select a destination
based on this concern or to require hospitals to screen medical tourists for
exposure in countries with emerging antibiotic resistance.
In addition, the failure of the classical IHR regime illustrates another
potential problem with attempting to enforce only reporting requirements. With
no control over national responses, there is little state motivation to report
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See Section II.B.
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those countries.
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emergence of new antibiotic-resistant bacteria.' The prior International Health
Regulations, before the 2005 revision, illustrated the problems with compliance
with an information-forcing-only scheme.14
C. National Containment Procedures to Prevent Transmission
of Incoming Antibiotic-Resistant Bacteria
A third alternative structure for containment would be to use only national
regulatory schemes, possibly in addition to an information-forcing scheme. It is
possible that political concerns about travel and trade restrictions would create
proper motivation to force accurate information regarding antibiotic-resistant
bacteria, since countries with a high number of medical tourists but less
economic benefit from the medical tourism industry would otherwise place
overly restrictive regulations in order to protect themselves. This proposal most
closely approximates the classical International Health Regulation scheme in
place prior to the 2005 revision. The classical regime had a number of problems
while in force:
[P]ublic health experts raised questions about the substantive nature of the
classical regime, indicating that the law no longer responded to public health
reality. In 1969, for example, one expert noted that the IHR did not apply to
many infectious diseases that posed similar risks of international spread as
the diseases subject to the Regulations. Similarly, another expert argued in
1974 that the diseases subject to the IHR "are the pestilential diseases of the
past", implying that the IHR were backward-looking rather than geared to
the infectious diseases the world faced in the present and future. These
criticisms illustrated the extent to which WHO did not revise, update and
modernize the classical regime through its innovative constitutional
provisions.141
The foremost concerns of the classical regime were that accurate information
would not be reported and that the diseases included in the classical regime were
limited and did not include newly arising health concerns. However, national
containment procedures would suffer from similar problems: namely, the
individual states would not receive information soon enough to prevent
transmission and, without that information, the national regimes would not
update information quickly enough to screen for the most current health
concerns.

J Intl L at 333-35 (cited in note 37) (discussing four principle factors that
led to the "marginalization and stagnation" of the prior regulative scheme).
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VII. CONCLUSION
The threat of emerging antibiotic-resistant bacteria in combination with
medical tourism creates a significant public health and economic threat to
national healthcare and patients. Due to the broad revisions in 2005, the IHR
both applies to the development of this new danger and provides sufficient and
appropriate levels of control through recommendations of travel and trade
restrictions. The text of the IHR encompasses antibiotic-resistant bacteria when
transmission via medical tourism is considered. Other alternative measures of
containment, including market incentives, national regulation and informationforcing regimes, would not adequately protect countries from transmission into
healthcare environments. Containment of antibiotic-resistant bacteria
transmission through medical tourism using the IHR comports with the history,
purpose, and text of the IHR and fits into the jurisdiction of the WHO.
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